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Volume 2, Number 19 (October 23, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
President finds accommodation with Duma 
President Yel'tsin met with Duma representatives this week and reached a 
compromise on various issues of contention between the executive and 
legislature. At the core of this negotiated cooling of tensions are agreements by 
the president to withdraw the government's Tax Code bill, sign the Duma's Law 
on the Government, establish an advisory council (yet another!) to consist of 
regional leaders and government members, and a promise to work at reconciling 
opposing views on the Land Code and housing reform. For their part, the Duma 
opposition, led by the Communist faction, has agreed to remove the "no 
confidence" vote from its agenda. The Duma's request for the removal of first 
deputy prime ministers Anatoli Chubais and Boris Nemtsov was also rebuffed. 
(The Moscow Times, 21 Oct 97; NEXIS) 
 
There are several interesting aspects to this sudden outburst of cooperative 
negotiation, not the least of which is the institutional. Yel'tsin revived the dormant 
"Council of Four" to shape the first round of talks on October 20. This council, 
created just prior to his bypass surgery last year, was originally intended to 
provide a forum for discussion between the executive and legislative branches 
while the president was unable to serve as personal arbiter. The original 
composition of the council consisted of the speakers of the Federation Council 
and Duma, the prime minister, and Anatoli Chubais representing the president. 
Its operation was quickly derailed over the legislative leaders' refusal to accept 
Chubais as the president's proxy during his convalescence. This most recent 
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convocation of the council, with Yel'tsin's prominent participation, has re-
invigorated the council, which is now slated to convene twice monthly. 
 
The second round of executive-legislative negotiations occurred the following day 
as Yel'tsin met with representatives of the seven Duma factions, as well as 
several members of the presidential administration. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Oct 97; 
NEXIS) Evidently, the president's assurances during this conciliation session 
convinced participants that the advisory council of regional, executive and 
legislative leaders would have a major role in policy formation. Its first session is 
slated for November 22 and agricultural land ownership tops its agenda. 
 
Much print space has already been devoted to the questions of who backed 
down and who gave in during the spiraling confrontation between president and 
parliament this Fall. Once again in Russian politics, the vagaries of the 
agreement need further elucidation before the winners and losers can be tallied. 
Did the president agree to a Law on the Government, which provides for 
parliamentary oversight (and dismissal powers) of the government? Did the 
Duma opposition, most notably the Communists, give in to presidential threats to 
their parliamentary perks? (See, among others, The Boston Globe, 22 Oct 97) 
 
The question of who most benefited from the compromise solution is 
controversial. If the opposition Duma factions (opposition only in reference to the 
executive branch) could expect stronger support from a disillusioned populace, 
then they would seem to have a powerful incentive to provoke new elections. If 
the executive's threat of revising election rules was thought to jeopardize 
opposition support, then a maintenance of the status quo, with caveats, would 
benefit the opposition. 
 
Yel'tsin's decision to tone down his threatening rhetoric on dissolution and 
compromise with the Duma is seen by some as a tactical retreat in the face of 
broad opposition encompassing the Communists, many regional leaders, and 
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Yabloko. According to this scenario, Yel'tsin will work to weaken the opposition 
coalition and move against them with a stronger hand. (See comments by 
Stanislav Menshikov on Johnson's Russia List, #1307, 22 Oct 97) There has 
already been a backlash in the Duma with Sergei Baburin leading a small faction 
of deputies calling the compromise a "strategic mistake." (Agence France Press, 
2 Oct 97; e-news@clari.net) 
 
A final assessment will have to wait for an implementation or re-interpretation of 
the elements of the executive-legislative accord. The critical issues of the Law on 
Government, Tax Code, land and housing reforms will provide the litmus tests to 
gauge the performance of the cooperative councils. At least this Autumn's display 
of brinkmanship ended peacefully. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Russia befriends Germany and France, snubs US and UK ... 
Emboldened by his success in luring France into a controversial $2 billion deal to 
develop oil fields in Iran, Russian President Boris Yel'tsin announced at Council 
of Europe meetings that France, Germany and Russia would meet annually to 
discuss events on the Eurasian continent. 
 
The declaration was seen as a snub to Britain, whose prime minister, Tony Blair, 
had just concluded a lackluster visit to Moscow. The announcement of the 
trilateral meetings came two hours after Blair had left the council meeting. (Press 
Association, 1747 GMT, 10 Oct 97; FBIS-WEU-97-283). 
 
The announcement also had an anti-American tinge, coming a week after Yel'tsin 
had decried condemnation of the oil deal in the American press and White House 
pressure to expand European institutions through NATO enlargement. In a thinly 
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veiled reference to "Uncle Sam," Yel'tsin had said that "We do not need an uncle 
from elsewhere. We in Europe can unite ourselves." (Reuters, 8 Oct 97; 
Johnson's Russia List #1269). 
 
Yel'tsin highlights common stance with Europe on executions, rights ... 
In his speech to the Council of Europe, Yel'tsin highlighted Russia's moratorium 
on capital punishment as evidence that his country was meeting European norms 
of justice, and suggested that the rebellious province of Chechnya was not 
meeting such standards. 
 
"Russia has imposed a moratorium on the execution of capital punishment. We 
strictly fulfill this obligation," Yel'tsin said. "I know that the European public has 
been shocked with the news of public executions in Chechnya. The Russian 
leadership takes all the necessary measures to localize such manifestations of 
Middle Ages barbarity." 
 
The emphasis on capital punishment also drew a line between the countries of 
Continental Europe, which do not execute any criminals, and Britain and the 
United States, both of which have capital punishment provisions in their law. 
 
Later in the speech, Yel'tsin also took a swipe at the Baltic states for allegedly not 
living up to European standards of language rights and citizenship. "Our country 
cannot put up with the fact that hundreds of thousands of people, including our 
compatriots, have no citizenship in modern Europe," Yel'tsin said. "I hope that 
this issue will be settled in Latvia and Estonia." (RIA Novosti, Rossiyskiye vesti, 
14 Oct 97; Johnson's Russia List #1283) 
 
...and landmines 
In an apparently impromptu gesture, Yel'tsin also announced that Russia would 
sign the Ottawa Convention banning the use of land mines. His comments came 
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after his speech and just after a meeting with French president Jacques Chirac, a 
supporter of the ban. 
 
Russian commentators found Yel'tsin's off-the-cuff declaration to be of a piece 
with other slights to the United States. "There is an impression that the European 
factor is starting to dominate Russian foreign policy," Itogi, NTV television's 
weekly analytical program, reported. "In fact, all Yel'tsin's initiatives had a strong 
anti-American flavor." (Reuters, 14 Oct 97; Johnson's Russia List #1284) 
 
But the Russian military quickly soft-pedaled Yel'tsin's comments. An unnamed 
high-ranking military officer told Nezavisimaya gazeta that Yel'tsin's 
announcement was nothing more than pure "populism," and that it violated 
Russian national interests. (Monitor, 15 Oct 97). 
 
Bulgarians blast alleged Russian recruitment of spies, destabilization 
Bulgarian journalists and government officials have condemned alleged efforts by 
the Russian ambassador to recruit a circle of pro-Moscow "agents of influence" in 
the capital. 
 
The Standard, a daily close to the pro-Western Bulgarian government, on 6 
October accused Russian ambassador Leonid Kerestedzhiyants of using the 
embassy as a base for a secretive organization, "Association on Friendship with 
Russia." The paper also accused Gazprom, the Russian gas firm, of planning to 
disrupt gas deliveries to Bulgaria in an attempt to destabilize the government. 
The Russian embassy denied all accusations. (ITAR-TASS, 1351 GMT, 7 Oct 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-280) 
 
Russia repays one-third of debt to Slovakia in part with weapons 
Between 1995 and 1997, the Russian Federation has repaid one-third of its $1.7 
billion debt to Slovakia with shipments of goods worth $560 million, according to 
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Russian Deputy Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. A large but unspecified 
amount of the goods were arms, according to Interfax. 
 
Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Babichev praised the political, economic, and 
military technical cooperation of Moscow and Bratislava, claiming it differs for the 
better from Russia's relations with other Central and East European countries. 
He said the many-sided cooperation is of a strategic nature. (Interfax, 1101 GMT, 
10 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-283) 
 
Tense Russo-Japanese relations as Moscow cancels meeting 
Russia called off a planned meeting on the Sakhalin region a mere 24 hours 
before its scheduled start on 9 October. 
 
Russian officials claimed that the meeting had been canceled because members 
of the Japanese delegation had failed to comply with unspecified requirements. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1045 GMT, 8 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-281) But the decision came 
just as the Russian Foreign Ministry was scheduled to begin talks in Moscow with 
another Japanese delegation on fishing rights near the disputed Kuril islands. 
 
The ministry had complained that the Japanese were insisting on adding too 
many political dimensions to an agreement that Moscow had hoped would be 
merely commercial. (Interfax, 1154 GMT, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-286) 
 
Russian legislators introduce bill to strengthen ties to Taiwan 
Bucking the pro-Chinese policies of the Russian foreign ministry, members of the 
Russian Duma on 3 October introduced a bill to formalize Moscow's ties to 
Taipei. 
 
The bill, modeled on the American Taiwan Relations Act, was promoted by 
Alexei Mitrofonov, chairman of the Geographical Policy Committee of the State 
Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament. 
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Wang Wei-chieh, director of the West Asian Affairs department in the Taiwanese 
Foreign Ministry, acknowledged the bill stood little chance of becoming law. 
Russian parliamentary rules mandate that the bill must be approved by the 
Foreign Affairs Committee before it is referred to a plenary session for a second 
reading. During a public hearing on the bill in July, Russian foreign ministry 
officials voiced strong opposition to the bill. (Central News Agency WWW 
(Taiwan), 0859 GMT, 3 Oct 97; FBIS-CHI-97-276) 
 
Comment 
Safe European Home? 
Perhaps Boris Yel'tsin was wrong to insist that Russia needed a new ideology to 
replace Communism. After all, a country that has a scant sense of itself can 
change its colors to suit its audience. 
 
In April, Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov won the hearts of Asian leaders by 
espousing the virtues of non-Western traditions. And yet when Boris Yel'tsin 
attended the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg six months later, he took 
every opportunity to highlight his government's commitment to common 
(Continental) European values, such as rejection of the death penalty and, less 
appealingly, development of "pragmatic" economic ties with pariah nations such 
as Iran. 
 
There is, of course, a common theme running through these disparate, even 
contradictory, statements. Disgruntled leaders of countries that have run afoul of 
US foreign policy, be they Asian dictators or beleaguered Eurocrats, may 
celebrate Moscow's insistence that the United States has too much influence in 
world affairs. 
 
The Council of Europe is little more than a discussion club. But Yel'tsin's success 
at its recent meeting demonstrates the importance of rhetoric in international 
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affairs, and the inability of the Clinton Administration to put forward a compelling 
vision of internal security that might dampen the appeal of Moscow's 
resentments. 
 
The bellwether of future alliances will be Britain, a traditional US ally. Prime 
Minister Tony Blair was deeply disappointed that his visits to Moscow and 
Strasbourg did not earn him anointment as the next spokesman of Europe. The 
United States has great interest in seeing Blair's appeal spread across the 
Continent, since his Labor Party promises to lead a center-left reform of its 
crumbling welfare state. If buoyed by broad international appeal, this effort might 
well be emulated by social democrats on the Continent, ensuring the stability of 
the region's political economy. 
 
If, on the other hand, the United States does not put forward a compelling vision 
of European affairs, Blair may be cowed into submitting to the anti-American 
rhetoric now spoken in Moscow and echoed in Paris. Europe will then be left to 
drift back into the befuddled malaise that, prior to Ronald Reagan's tenure, 
shrouded the Continent in gloom. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
MEDIA 
Russian TV to be broadcast to North America and Europe 
The broadcast company MCM International has signed an agreement with the 
private Russian TV company Worldwide Russian Channel (WRC) to carry WRC's 
signal outside of Russia. Viewers in Europe and North America will now be able 
to receive transmission by means of small satellite dishes for individual use. Until 
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recently, the television reception of Russian programming was of poor quality. 
This will not be the case with this new venture due to the technology made 
available by the Eutelsat company. The new broadcast plans to operate twenty-
four hours a day and will provide a wide variety of programming. The 
programming will, of course, be in Russian. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1517 
GMT, 22 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-234) 
 
Petersburg TV hands over control to Moscow 
St. Petersburg Channel 5 TV has gone off the air as a result of the changes 
following Yel'tsin's decision to set up the all-Russia Kultura channel. Not 
surprisingly, this has met with considerable disappointment by the more 
independent-minded journalists. Channel 5 announcer Igor Strakhov claims that 
this development would finally centralize all nation-wide media control in the 
capital under the watchful eyes of the Kremlin and its bureaucrats. Strakhov 
notes that, without regional TV, the "voice of the people" will less likely be heard 
by the powers-that-be (Fifth Channel Television Network, 1230 GMT, 30 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-242) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Communists and nationalists picket Duma 
Radical left-wing organizations -- the Working Russia Movement and the Officers 
Union -- picketed the State Duma building in connection with the opening of the 
first plenary sitting of the parliament's lower chamber. Around 100 people took 
part in the action, including Working Russia leader, Viktor Anpilov. Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, the chairman of the LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) was 
also present (Mayak Radio Network in Russian, 0900 GMT, 3 Sep 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-246). 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Shokhin elected leader of NDR faction 
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Aleksandr Shokhin, first deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma, was 
elected to the post of leader of the Our Home is Russia faction. He had been 
nominated by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and elected by 50 of 
65 members of the faction. Fifteen members of the faction were not present for 
the vote. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1625 GMT, 3 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-246) 
 
REGIONS 
Communists wiped out in Saratov elections 
Not a single leftist candidate was returned to office in the elections to the Saratov 
Oblast Duma even though the area was targeted for special attention by the 
national party bosses. In all, 40 campaign volunteers from outside the oblast 
were involved in the election -- including Zyuganov. In 33 of the 35 districts 
where the results were deemed to be valid, the winners tended to be managers 
of large business concerns. The governor of the oblast -- Dmitri Ayatskov -- 
argued that the election results were proof of the success of Yel'tsin's economic 
and social reforms (Trud, 3 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-246) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Secret Russian Black Eagle tank demonstrated; new Sukhoi fighter flying 
While not displayed at the latest Omsk '97 arms show, the Black Eagle was 
demonstrated at a proving ground outside of Svetly by the administrators of the 
Omsk defense plant Transmash during the show held 3-6 September. The 
demonstration was in violation of state security directives according to Viktor 
Mironov, the regional FSB Directorate Chief and is under investigation. 
Anticipating a high level of foreign intelligence interest, the FSB had taken 
preventative measures, but were apparently undermined by the unauthorized 
demonstration. Mironov stated that 44 known foreign intelligence officers were 
identified and others suspected. In addition, a large contingent involved with the 
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M1 Abrahms tank from General Dynamics attended. While plant administrators 
met their goal of showing the robustness of the Russian defense industry, 
Mironov said that the display could undermine the successful export of other 
tanks and modifications which are quite competitive alternatives to the Black 
Eagle. The Black Eagle was described as having an ominous, camouflage-
painted shape with a stealth-like roll and is equipped with Arena and Drozd 
systems for armor protection. (ITAR-TASS, 1403 GMT, 6 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
279) 
 
Though denied by Sukhoi's chief designer, Vladimir Konokhov, Pravda has 
restated an ITAR-TASS report from 8 October which announced the beginning of 
testing of the Su-32, a secret, state-of-the-art "forward-swept" wing fighter. The 
military-industrial complex source was described as very reliable. Purportedly, 
aircraft designers expect unique handling characteristics as a result of the wing 
design. (Pravda, 9 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-282) The US Air Force's X-29 also has 
a forward-swept wing design. 
 
Arms export agreements continue to add up 
Indian Defense Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav met with Russian leadership, 
including Defense Minister Sergeev, during a five-day visit to Moscow 6-10 
October. The Russian-Indian defense and military cooperation program in the 
21st century was the focus of discussions with the objective of broadening and 
increasing the levels of exchange. In addition to a large-scale contract signed 
late last year for 40 advanced multi-purpose Su-30 fighters for the Indian Air 
Force, projected Indian purchases included two Kilo-class submarines, 
destroyers and Ka-30 helicopters. Of great interest to India is the purchase of the 
Russian air defense missile system S-300 PMU-1 as the backbone of a large-
scale anti-aircraft and missile defense to be deployed by the year 2000. Yadav 
described the outcome of the visit as "extremely successful" and announced 
India's commitment to buy all military hardware from Russia. In addition, he said 
that the cooperation program had evolved from arms sales to production co-
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operation and joint development, offering the Su-30MKI joint R&D and the 
potential MiG-AT Advanced Trainer production as examples. (ITAR-TASS, 0732 
GMT, 6 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-279) (Bangalore Deccan Herald, 9 Oct 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-282) 
 
Konstantin Makienko, Deputy Director of the Russian Center for Analysis, 
Strategies and Technologies, has stated that the annual volume of arms trade 
with India is nearly $1 billion and sees any decrease as unlikely. He describes 
India as "absolutely our partner in trade in arms and related services because it 
is the only country with which Russia has signed a long-term cooperation 
program in the arms trade till the year 2001." This program is of great benefit to 
Russia, both politically and commercially. Makienko describes India as timely in 
its payments, a distraction of part of China's military might, and perhaps most 
importantly, "a serious opponent of the Islamic world." He said that future 
weapon sales may also include the KA-50 Black Shark helicopter in response to 
the Ukrainian tank deliveries to Pakistan and most likely the aircraft-carrying 
cruiser Admiral Gorshkov. (Interfax, 1405 GMT, 8 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-281) 
 
Additional arms sales/defense agreements are underway between Russia and 
both Ethiopia and Singapore. The Ethiopian cooperation plan will include the 
training and retraining of Ethiopian servicemen in Russian military schools and 
defense industry and provide for the service and repair of Russian-made military 
hardware. (Interfax, 1247 GMT, 2 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-275) Singapore has 
announced a purchase of an undisclosed number of the Igla (SA-16) air defense 
missile system. The Igla is an advanced man-portable missile using an infra-red 
seeker head and having a range of approximately 6000 meters. (Xinhua, 15 Oct 
97, Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 16 Oct 97) 
 
Despite an active arms sales program, the Russian defense industry continues to 
suffer. In Russian parliamentary hearings on 13 October, it was stated that every 
second defense industry enterprise in Russia is near bankruptcy. (ITAR-TASS, 
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1330 GMT, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-286) The main culprit appears to be the 
continuing non-payment for Russian defense orders. The defense ministry owes 
in excess of 300 billion rubles. With upcoming plans to increase the privitization 
of the Russian defense industry in '98, it will be interesting to see how effectively 
the sell-off will boost government revenues and how industry values will be set. 
With continued development of state-of-the art weapons such as the Black Eagle 
and the Su-32 and lack of payment by the defense ministry, even more 
aggressive arms export marketing is in the future. 
 
Space advertising for space exploration? 
The general director of the Russian Space Agency expressed concern about 
Russian space program finances in an ITAR-TASS interview conducted 2 
October. Yuri Koptev said detailed terms for space advertising would soon be 
announced. He expected revenues to be distributed between space equipment 
producers, production complexes and cosmonauts. (ITAR-TASS, 0904 GMT, 2 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-275) 
 
In other space news the future of GLONASS (the Russian equivalent of the 
American global positioning system, GPS) is in question. The GLONASS 
constellation consists of 24 satellites. Currently 10 of the satellites in the 
constellation have reached the end of their useful life and there are no current 
plans to replace them with longer-life satellites. The Russians figure the satellite 
navigation business could be worth as much as $30 billion by 2005. But as it 
stands now the US will have a monopoly on the service. The Russians figure 
maintaining and improving GLONASS could allow them to capture about a 
quarter of the precision navigation business. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 3 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-279) 
 
Defense minister denies Russian participation in NATO operation 
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev denied Western press reports that 
Russian peacekeepers in Bosnia assisted NATO troops in the seizure of four 
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Bosnian Serb television stations. "Observation from two posts--and this is all the 
Russian peacekeepers did--can hardly be described as participation in an 
operation," Sergeev said. (Interfax, 0717 GMT, 2 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-275) 
 
Strategic forces conduct major exercise 
Russian strategic nuclear forces conducted a major exercise at the beginning of 
October in which all three legs of Russia's strategic triad participated. Northern 
Fleet SSBNs and Strategic Rocket Forces launched a total of six missiles to 
targets in Kamchatka. The mobile missile system Topel-M was employed and 
Russian Air Force "Backfire" and "Bear" bombers fired cruise missiles. In addition 
to strategic weapons duties, the Topel-M can also be employed to place civilian 
satellites into orbit. (Monitor, 3 Oct 97, and Interfax, 1103 GMT, 3 Oct 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-276) 
 
Sergeev: 5-6 servicemen die every day 
Visiting units in the Moscow Military District, Defense Minister Sergeev called for 
military reforms that will put the military on a professional footing in the future. He 
said the army of the future must not suffer the problems today's armed forces 
suffer. He made the startling revelation that five or six service men are killed 
every day. "We cannot put up with this. Nor can we tolerate hazing in the armed 
forces." (Interfax, 0620 GMT, 15 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-288). 
 
Sergeev's comments come two weeks after the Russian Main Military 
Prosecutor's Office announced it was taking steps to combat hazing in the armed 
forces. The office was forming special teams to investigate units where hazing 
has been reported. About one dozen hazing cases were under criminal 
investigation. These actions come as the Russian armed forces started the 
Autumn conscription period, which has a goal of inducting 184,000 conscripts 
into the armed forces. General Staff Officers expressed doubts whether this goal 
could be obtained given the opportunities for draft deferments and the number of 
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youths willing to dodge the draft. (Monitor, 10 Oct 97, and Interfax, 1120 GMT, 2 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-275) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
CIS administration has a full week 
Many of the CIS administrative structures were busy recently, working on 
proposals to be presented at the Heads of State summit later this month. 
Meetings were held by the Council of Heads of Government, Council of CIS 
Foreign Ministers, Council of CIS Defense Chiefs, Heads of Security and Secret 
Services, and the Inter-Parliamentary Committee of the countries of the Customs 
Union. 
 
The Council of Heads of Government produced 26 documents, including a 
convention on regulating social-labor relationships in multinational corporations. 
Also drafted were documents regulating the formation of a common CIS 
transportation space including an agreement on tariffs for freight shipments 
across commonwealth countries. A series of agreements on military issues was 
drawn up which concern the strengthening of border troops and the further 
development of the unified air defense system (Delovoy mir, 10 Oct 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-287). There was, as one might expect, some degree of dissension at the 
meeting. The Georgian delegate refused to approve a procedure meant to 
increase economic integration (ITAR-TASS, 9 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-282). 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Pustovoytenko agreed to sign only 13 of the 
documents, and three of those contained reservations (Interfax, 10 Oct 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-283). 
 
Hennadiy Udovenko kept faith with his colleague in the heads of government 
council by offering opposition at the Council of CIS Foreign Ministers conference. 
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Udovenko would not sign a document which would create a "committee on 
conflict situations." He also insisted on setting up a permanent body to monitor 
CIS expenditures (ITAR-TASS, 2 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-275). Ukraine has 
become increasingly more suspicious about how CIS money and resources are 
being spent. 
 
The Council of CIS Defense Ministers also had a meeting and spent most of its 
time discussing the development of military cooperation "in the framework of a 
collective security treaty." It is not yet clear whether they will call for a new 
security treaty or just an expansion of the Tashkent Treaty of 1992. The 
ministers, at the insistence of Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze, 
discussed the situation in Abkhazia. Nadibaidze is still hoping that the Heads of 
State decision made at the March 1997 summit will be implemented and called 
for the appointment of a new commander for the peacekeeping troops. Russian 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev took the opportunity to introduced the new chief of 
staff for coordinating CIS military cooperation, General Viktor Samsonov. 
Samsonov until recently served as chief of the Russian general staff (Interfax, 3 
Oct 97; FBIS-UMA-97-276). 
 
The Heads of Security and Secret Services met to discuss measures to fight 
organized crime, weapons and drug trafficking, terrorism, and ensuring nuclear 
safety. Nikolai Kovalev, head of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), 
presided at the conference and focused on providing security for "strategic 
objects" on CIS territory which he defined as facilities which present a nuclear 
and environmental hazard (Basapress, 8 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-281, and Infotag, 
9 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-282). Kovalev went on to say that, "It is absolutely 
obvious also that we need to cooperate more actively in combating the 
operations of the intelligence services of other countries on the territory of the 
[CIS]. More than 400 intelligence agents, who are working on the territory of our 
country, have been disclosed in Russia. And it is necessary to coordinate our 
actions to counter them" (ITAR-TASS, 8 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-281). 
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The final administrative organ to meet was the Inter-Parliamentary Committee of 
the Customs Union. The group (consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Russia) has been unable to forge or implement policies creating a 
functioning union, and no other CIS states seem interested in joining until such 
procedures can be worked out (Mayak Radio Network, 1400 GMT, 10 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-283). 
 
CIS air defense system fiscal planning outlined 
General Viktor Prudnikov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian and CIS Air 
Defense Troops, discussed his service's budget. To achieve a truly integrated 
system, the general estimates that approximately 101 billion rubles will be 
needed. Russia has pledged 50 billion rubles, and the remaining nine member 
countries will contribute the remaining 51 billion. According to Prudnikov, each 
state is essentially financing facilities and training on its own territory and will be 
able to command and control its own assets. The Central Air Defense Command 
Post in Russia will coordinate the actions of national command posts. The troops 
and facilities in Kazakhstan and Belarus, however, will continue to be controlled 
from Russia. (Mayak Radio Network, 1300 GMT 13 Oct 97; FBIS-UMA-97-286, 
and ITAR-TASS, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-UMA-97-286). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Mark Jones 
 
More claims of autonomy in the republics 
Georgia has Abkhazia, Moldova has Dniestr, Ukraine has Crimea, and now both 
Ukraine and Moldova might have Gagauz. Leaders of the Gagauz opposition in 
Moldova have issued a statement calling the 2 August 1940 decision of the 
Supreme Soviet to divide historical Bessarabia "anti-popular." The opposition 
went on to call for Gagauz residents in Moldova and Ukraine to sign up for the 
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"creation of a sole economic, social and cultural zone in the area" (Basapress, 1 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-275). 
 
BELARUS 
Bad news for Belarus...and its leader, part 2 
In the last edition we noted that the European Union Council of Ministers decided 
to limit political and economic ties with Belarus and that President Lukashenka 
was snubbed by the Council of Europe. This week there is more bad news for 
Belarus and its leader. The constitutional courts of Europe denied the 
Constitutional Court of Belarus permission to attend a conference later this year. 
A spokesmen for the European courts said that the Belarus Court did not meet 
the requirements necessary for the status of full membership (Belapan, 10 Oct 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-283). 
 
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov had harsh words for 
President Lukashenka. Nemtsov called the Belarusian Union extremely important 
but criticized the president, saying, "Lukashenka behaves like a young student." 
The remarks were made in connection with the imprisonment of ORT journalist 
Pavel Sheremet. Nemtsov claims that Lukashenka took revenge on Sheremet 
because the journalist criticized him in the past. "The feeling of resentment does 
not befit a politician," Nemtsov added (Interfax, 7 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-280). 
 
Killing of Lukashenka's friend brings harsh response 
President Lukashenka vowed to punish the "slightest violation of law" after his 
close friend, Yevgeni Mikolutsky, was killed by a bomb placed near his apartment 
door. In an emotional statement at the funeral, Lukashenka said, "From now on 
the slightest violation of law will be punished immediately. Our inactivity costs us 
the loss of those close to us." He then threatened local businessmen and 
bankers, who he believes know who killed his friend. He demanded that they 
"pay all taxes" within ten days. "We shall not look for proof. The slightest violation 
of law will cause an immediate response from the authorities," he said. The 
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president then went further and demanded a crackdown on those involved in 
illegal businesses, such as the unsanctioned sale of cigarettes and alcoholic 
drinks at railway terminals and markets. "Old women selling cigarettes, 
picketers...all of them must be dealt with rigorously" (Interfax, 7 Oct 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-280). Lukashenka also ordered Interior Minister Valentin Agolts to place 
all units of the Belarusian Interior Ministry on high alert for a period of five days 
(ITAR-TASS, 9 Oct 97; FBIS-TOT-97-282). 
 
ORT correspondent released 
Pavel Sheremet was released from the Belarus KGB Grodno Remand Center on 
7 October. Sheremet commented on the conditions of his imprisonment, noting 
that, "the pressure applied to me [to write a letter of repentance] was quite 
strong. They told me many times to write a letter to the president." He also said 
that, "I was kept in the same conditions as the other remand detainees in the 
Grodno Prison. Perhaps my only privilege was the fact that I was never struck 
with a truncheon..."(NTV, 8 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-281). 
 
MOLDOVA 
Power-sharing proposal drafted 
Delegates from Moldova, the breakaway Dniestr Republic and Russia met in 
Moscow to try to resolve the ongoing conflict in Moldova. The result of their work 
was a document which outlines some basic power-sharing arrangements. The 
agreement consists of 11 articles, most of which are dedicated to defining the 
plenary powers of each side. According to the plan, Moldova will be responsible 
for making decisions on citizenship, foreign policy, border defense, and customs 
services. The Dniestr Republic will be allowed to have input on human rights 
decisions, participate in foreign policy shaping for issues relating to the Dniestr 
region, establish external economic ties, and refine anti-crime measures. The 
division of plenary powers in defense, security, and border protection will be 
handled later. The accord will now be forwarded to President Petru Lucinschi and 
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Igor Smirnov. If they accept the agreement, it will be forwarded for signature at 
the CIS Heads of State summit (Infotag, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-287). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Kazakh president, Russian PM fail to resolve main differences 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and President Nazarbaev were unable to smooth 
over the main differences still facing their two countries during the Russian prime 
minister's recent (4-5 October) trip to Kazakhstan, and thus pave the way for the 
signing of a new treaty on friendship and cooperation (the first such treaty was 
signed in 1992 and now needs to be revised). The two main issues which the 
Russian and Kazakh governments have so far been unable to resolve are 
Russia's failure to pay for its use of the Baikonur space launch site and Russian 
oil companies' right to develop Kazakhstan's offshore Caspian oil deposits in the 
Kurmangazy field (located in the northern section of the Caspian Sea). According 
to President Nazarbaev, Russia owes the Kazakh government $460 million for its 
lease of the Baikonur facilities during the past four years, and has yet to pay for 
its use of military training sites in Kazakhstan (Interfax, 0954 GMT, 4 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-277). 
 
The two governments' disagreement over the development of the Kurmangazy oil 
deposits began when Russia's Fuel and Energy Ministry unilaterally decided to 
start accepting bids for the field's geological exploration (see Editorial Digest on 
Central Asia, 9 October 97). Since the Kazakh government considers this field to 
be in its national sector (a point which President Nazarbaev reiterated), the 
Russian ministry's action constitutes a violation of Kazakhstan's territorial 
sovereignty. Although President Nazarbaev did not bring this issue up during his 
joint press conference with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, he did state that the 
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matter had to be resolved before any agreements could be signed on allowing 
Russian oil companies to develop the Kurmangazy oil field (Interfax, 0954 GMT, 
4 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-277). 
 
President Nazarbaev and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also have differing views 
on the extent to which Russian oil companies should be involved in the 
Kurmangazy field's exploitation. The Kazakh president favors granting tenders to 
those companies which offer the best terms, whereas the Russian prime minister 
would prefer that Russian companies be given priority in the field's development. 
Russia's Lukoil and Kazakhstan's Kazakhoil companies are considering drawing 
up a joint agreement to exploit the Kurmangazy field's deposits, but the deal has 
not yet been finalized (Interfax, 0954 GMT, 4 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-277). 
 
President Nazarbaev hopes to have his government's disputes with Russia 
settled by June of next year, in time for President Yel'tsin's visit to Kazakhstan, 
which is planned for the first half of 1998, primarily for the purpose of signing the 
new Kazakh-Russian treaty on friendship and cooperation (Interfax, 0954 GMT, 4 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-277). 
 
Kazakhstan ready to export oil, gas to world market via any corridor 
At a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Kuchma on 14 October, 
President Nazarbaev announced that his government is willing to export its oil 
and natural gas resources via any route, including through Ukrainian territory. 
Kazakhstan currently produces 25 million-26 million tons of oil per year, of which 
only 15 million tons are for domestic consumption. By 2005, Kazakhstan plans to 
expand its oil production to 100 million tons, by 2010 to 140 million tons, and by 
2017 to 170 million tons. At peak capacity, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium will 
be able to handle only up to 67 million tons of both Russian and Kazakh oil, 
creating the need for new pipelines and transport routes. President Nazarbaev 
expressed interest in shipping Kazakh oil to Ukrainian refineries via Russian 
territory, and mentioned that, at the present time, Kazakhstan must transport its 
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oil by rail to the Baltics, from where it is exported to Western markets (Interfax, 
1612 GMT, 14 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-287). 
 
Kazakhstan recently concluded an agreement with the China National Petroleum 
Company (see Editorial Digest on Central Asia, 9 October) under which the 
construction of two new pipelines is planned: One pipeline is to run from 
Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan and another pipeline is to run from Kazakhstan's 
Aktyubinsk oil field to China's northwestern border. The Chinese company owns 
60% of the shares in the Aktyubinsk field, which is estimated to contain reserves 
of 130 million tons and an annual crude oil output of about 2.6 million tons 
(Xinhua, 1429 GMT, 10 Oct 97; FBIS-CHI-97-283). 
 
President Nazarbaev has also begun considering plans for exporting Kazakh oil 
to Japan. At a news conference on 3 October with a group of Japanese editorial 
writers, he mentioned that he had already discussed the possibility of shipping oil 
to Japan via China at the recent signing of the Kazakh-Chinese oil development 
contract (Kyodo, 0227 GMT, 4 Oct 97; FBIS-EAS-97-279). 
 
Kazakhstan selling explosives to Tajikistan 
According to a report by Moscow NTV, the Kazakh company Almaatavzryvprom, 
which manufactures components for explosive devices, has developed a new 
apparatus for the mining industry that reportedly is capable of producing 500 kg 
of an extremely explosive substance in 30 seconds. This apparatus is being sold 
to Tajikistan and apparently Russia also intends to buy a manufacturing license 
for this device. The explosive substance produced by the new apparatus is 
currently being used by researchers of the national nuclear center at 
Semipalatinsk to destroy radiation-contaminated silos. The main advantage of 
this explosive material is its low price: $200-220 per ton, compared to $700 per 
ton for similar substances in the United States (NTV, 1000 GMT, 13 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-286). 
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Comment 
Unfortunately, the Moscow NTV report did not give the name of either the new 
equipment or of the explosives which it produces. 
 
Kazakh metal workers go on hunger strike after police bar their march 
On 1 October approximately 1,000 miners and other workers from the 
Achpolimetal metallurgical plant (located in Kentau, a town in southern 
Kazakhstan about 900 km from Almaty) who had begun a march to Almaty in 
order to confront President Nazarbaev over the issue of their unpaid wages, were 
stopped by 250 police near the town of Turkestan, after completing only 30 km of 
their journey to the capital. The police used trucks to block the workers' path and 
they were forced to spend the night near Turkestan. The workers have not been 
paid for the past 10 months (Interfax, 0908 GMT, 2 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-275). 
The workers blame President Nazarbaev's economic policies for nearly 
destroying Kazakhstan's mining industry, and for impoverishing them and their 
families (ITAR-TASS, 0920 GMT, 6 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-279). As of 13 
October, another 1,000-2,000 people from surrounding towns and villages had 
joined the original group of workers, who had established a camp near the Arys 
River. 500 of these demonstrators went on a hunger strike between 11 and 13 
October, and the march participants have declared that they will not return home 
until they have been paid in full (ITAR-TASS, 1505 GMT, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-
97-286). President Nazarbaev has denied the demonstrators' request to meet 
with him and tensions are rising (NTV, 0800 GMT, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
286). The demonstrators' path across the Arys River is cut off by police and anti-
riot troops (ITAR-TASS, 1505 GMT, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-286). 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Rezvon Sodirov's group continues to harass the Tajik government 
On 2 October Rezvon Sodirov and his remaining supporters kidnapped two 
relatives of Presidential Guard commander Ghaffur Mirzoev in Dushanbe and 
transported them to an unknown location (ITAR-TASS, 0741 GMT, 3 Oct 97; 
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FBIS-SOV-97-276). On 9 October the Presidential Guard launched an operation 
to obtain the hostages' release (Sodirov has been holding a number of other 
hostages since summer, including the two sons of Tajikistan's state religious 
leader, Mufti -- see Editorial Digests on Central Asia for 25 September 1997 and 
9 September 1997), and General Mirzoev announced that three of Sodirov's 
supporters, who had recently been arrested near Dushanbe, claimed that all of 
the hostages were still alive (Interfax, 0644 GMT, 9 Oct 97; FBIS-UMA-97-282). 
Sodirov is believed to be holding ten hostages (ITAR-TASS, 0605 GMT; 11 Oct 
97, FBIS-SOV-97-284). 
 
On 11 October General Mirzoev announced that three more of Sodirov's 
supporters had been captured in a suburb of Dushanbe, and that Presidential 
Guard units had been conducting intensive searches for the rest of Sodirov's 
party in the mountains near the capital (ITAR-TASS, 0605 GMT, 11 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-284). Two days later, General Mirzoev reported that more of 
Sodirov's supporters had been arrested and that bases believed to belong to the 
militia group had been found in the mountains near Dushanbe. One of the 
hostages was also found dead during the search operation. It is believed that he 
was shot to death by Sodirov and his men (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1420 
GMT, 13 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-286). 
 
US to provide additional $35 million in aid to Tajikistan 
At a meeting with National Reconciliation Commission Chairman Said Abdullo 
Nuri (who is also chairman of the United Tajik Opposition) on 7 October, Grant 
Smith, the US ambassador to Tajikistan, announced that the US government had 
decided to provide the Tajik government with an additional $35 million in aid. 
These funds are to be used specifically for the revitalization of Tajikistan's 
industrial enterprises, as well as to foster the development of the country's small 
business sector. The ambassador emphasized the US government's interest in 
aiding Tajikistan's rapid economic recovery (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0838 
GMT, 8 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-281). 
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President Rahmonov to be final arbiter on allocation of ministries 
Ibrohim Usmonov, a senior member of the Tajik parliament and chair of the 
political subcommission of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), 
informed foreign news agencies (BBC and ITAR-TASS) in early October that 
President Rahmonov will make the final decision on which ministries and 
government posts will be granted to the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The Tajik 
president will also have final authority over which UTO members are appointed to 
these government positions. The UTO representatives in the NRC may nominate 
candidates to the various posts, but President Rahmonov will have ultimate 
approval. Once the UTO representatives have issued their final list of 
nominations, President Rahmonov will meet with the NRC's chairman, Said 
Abdullo Nuri, and following their meeting will make his final decision via decree. 
This decree is then to be submitted to Tajikistan's parliament (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 0937 GMT, 2 Oct 97, 1254 GMT, 16 Sep 97; NEXIS). 
 
Comment 
As the ultimate judge not only of which ministries and government posts are 
granted to the UTO, but also of which UTO members are appointed to these 
positions, President Rahmonov will have considerable influence over the new 
government, as well as being able to exercise a great deal of leverage over the 
UTO's current leadership. Rahmonov has been accused in the past of trying to 
destroy the UTO's unity by splitting its leadership (the UTO is made up of three 
different groups); perhaps he is once again trying to achieve this aim. 
 
Prosecutor-general's office completes assassination investigation 
On 3 October, the Tajik Prosecutor-General's Office announced on Tajik radio 
that its investigation into the assassination attempt on President Rahmonov on 
30 April 1997 (see Editorial Digest on Central Asia for April 1997) had been 
completed, and that the case would be passed on to the Supreme Court. The 
Prosecutor-General has accused 15 people of having been involved in the 
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attempt on the President Rahmonov's life, including Abdulhafiz Abdulloev, 
brother of former Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov, who is now the leader 
of the National Revival opposition bloc (based in Khujand, a city in northern 
Tajikistan) (Tajik Radio First programme, 0800 GMT, 3 Oct 97; NEXIS). 
 
Comment 
It is difficult to interpret the Prosecutor-General's accusation against Abdulhafiz 
Abdulloev as anything other than a political move against his brother, Abdumalik 
Abdullojonov. There has been strong political opposition to President Rahmonov 
in Khujand since the early days of his presidency in 1993; in the spring of 1996 
there were a number of demonstrations against his government. In the fall of 
1997 the National Revival Bloc made an appeal to be included in the inter-Tajik 
peace negotiations, and their request was supported by the UTO. President 
Rahmonov, however, refused to let any of their representatives participate in the 
peace talks. He has thus far been unable to destroy Abdullojonov's party, 
although he and his supporters have tried to discredit it publicly on more than 
one occasion. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
LITHUANIA 
Presidential campaign begins 
A surprise announcement and allegations of KGB collaboration helped to start 
the 1997 presidential campaign season with a bang in early October. Despite a 
strong showing in a late September popularity poll (Interfax, 1545 GMT, 22 Sep 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-265), President Algirdas Brazauskas has chosen not to run for 
re-election, reinforcing earlier statements that he believes younger politicians 
should be given a chance to govern. (Interfax, 1856 GMT, 23 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-
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97-174) Brazauskas has been in office for five years. His term expires in 
February 1998. 
 
The other seasoned politician campaigning for the post, parliamentary chairman 
Vytautas Landsbergis, remains in the race, although he is facing lower poll 
standings (Interfax, 1724 GMT, 30 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-273) and allegations 
that he collaborated with the KGB--charges leveled by MP Audrius Butkevicius, 
who is himself facing charges of grand fraud and bribery (ELTA, 0939 GMT, 1 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-274). Landsbergis and Lithuanian Prime Minister 
Gediminas Vagnorius, both members of the conservative Homeland Union party, 
have called the charges against the Seimas chairman lies and provocations. The 
allegations, confirmed by six ex-KGB officers (ITAR-TASS, 2040 GMT, 6 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-279), were investigated by a special parliamentary commission 
and found to be "groundless slander," according to commission head Algimantas 
Sejunas (ELTA, 1124 GMT, 9 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-282). 
 
It is unclear how much harm the charges will bring to Landsbergis' candidacy. His 
popularity already is lower that other contenders for the presidency, including 
Valdas Adamkus, an environmentalist for the US who leads most popularity polls 
although he had to fight hard before winning a court appeal which deemed him 
eligible to run (Interfax, 1611 GMT, 10 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-283), and the 
former prosecutor general Arturas Paulauskas. (Interfax, 1724 GMT, 30 Sep 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-273). Another candidate from the US, MP Kazys Bobelis, has 
received permission from the Electoral Commission to run (ELTA, 0843 GMT, 6 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-279), while a third--Professor Liucija Baskauskaite--is 
bringing her appeal to the Constitutional Court (ELTA, 1303 GMT, 14 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-287). In addition, the rector of Vilnius University, Rolandas 
Pavilionis, announced his interest in becoming a candidate (ELTA, 0903 GMT, 6 
Oct 97l FBIS-SOV-97-279). Nominees have until 6 November to submit the 
20,000 signatures required for placement on the ballot. 
 
 28 
LATVIA 
You better watch out... 
Prime Minister Guntars Krasts continues to prove himself a hard taskmaster, 
fighting against disloyalty and earlier-voiced concerns that he would not be tough 
enough for the post. Last month he proposed a series of bills which would restrict 
the powers of deputies to ask questions in parliament, and warned that 
representation by political parties in the Cabinet would be reduced if members of 
those parties failed to support government decisions in parliament. (Interfax, 
1631 GMT, 10 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-253) This was followed by the 
announcement that he has a little book listing the names of deputies and 
ministers who have in some way acted against the government's interests. When 
the list is long enough, the report claims, Krasts will carry out certain, as yet 
unspecified, sanctions. At this point, Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis is 
reportedly the minister who has sinned the most (Radio Riga Network, 0800 
GMT, 1 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-274). 
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